Does State v. Nava help Chad?

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Case analysis 

I'm glad to be back to writing about the case.  It was too quiet for too long! Here are some thoughts about the Nava case.  As always, if you have specific questions, feel free to email me at info@thelorivallowstory.com

Let's look at John Prior's recent submission to the court. Caution, the following is a complex and sometimes nuanced legal analysis that may make your eyes glaze over. Prior's submission is standard, although the form differs from state to state. In some states, the filing might take the form of a pretrial memo to the court, outlining the evidentiary issues, the case law, and an argument as to why that case applies. It's a way to streamline the hearing and permit the judge to study any applicable cases in advance.  Prior is directing the judge's attention to a case that he believes guides the court on how to rule on the question of joining the cases.
 
When lawyers look to prior cases for guidance, they look at how the case is similar to their case or how the case is different from their case.  The more similar the facts, the more likely the judge will follow the precedent of the caselaw.  Prior directed the court to look at State v. Quentin Nava.  The case was just decided on June 11, 2020. The more recent a case is, the more likely the judge will apply its findings to the case at hand.
 
If you tried to read the Nava case and thought it was written in a foreign language, you're not alone. Law students spend three years learning how to read cases, and this particular case addresses several complex legal issues that are challenging to navigate.
 
The case is about sexual abuse of children by an adult male. Nava, the adult male, was sleeping on the couch. One night, he sexually touches a 12-year-old girl. The following night, he sexually touches her cousin, who is of similar age.  The DA charges Nava with two counts, one for each victim, on one indictment. 

The defense wanted the charges severed because they believed there was evidence in one count that would be prejudicial in the other.  The DA argued that the crimes were part of a common scheme or plan and should be tried together. There are some significant differences between Nava and the Daybell case.  I can also see the similarities and why John Prior is asking the court to consider the case when deciding joinder in the Daybell cases.
 
The first issue for Nava is a kind of legal gymnastics argument. It's relevant, but we'll try not to get bogged down in it. Appeals courts review cases in two different ways, which are called their standard of review.  Some cases are reviewed de novo (which means from the beginning).  That means the appeals court reviews the testimony's transcripts to determine if the facts presented support the judge's finding. The other way the court can review is for abuse of discretion.  In that case, the appeals judges are only asking whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in making the finding. In that case, the court does not review the underlying facts.

All states have rules that govern how both civil and criminal cases proceed.  In Idaho, criminal cases are governed by the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure (ICR). Those rules determine the process of criminal cases, including when they can be joined and when they can be severed. Joinder or severance can be as to the charges or as to the defendants. In Nava, there was one defendant and two charges with two victims.  In Daybell, there are two cases involving two defendants and at least two identical charges against two identical victims.

Oddly, the sections that cover joinder (putting two cases together), ICR 8, and severance (dividing one case into two) ICR 14 have two different review standards.  If the trial judge in a case orders two matters joined under ICR 8, the appeals court reviews that decision de novo, meaning it looks at the fact of the case.  If the judge orders charges filed together severed under ICR 14, an appeals court could only ask whether the judge abused her discretion when she ordered the case severed.  To join a case, the party asking for joinder must prove to the court that the charges involved a common scheme or plan involving both defendants and that the defendants would not be unduly prejudiced by the joinder.  To be clear, joinder is about convenience and economy, while severance is about fairness and undue prejudice.

The Nava appeal argued that the appeals court should have treated the severance motion the same as a rule 8 joinder motion and reviewed it de novo.  The court rejected Nava's argument and ruled that the severance motion would be reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In Nava, the initial indictment was against one defendant and contained two charges for two different victims. Nava's attorney asked to sever the charges, and the DA wanted them kept together. Keeping the charges together made it easier for the prosecutor, who would only have to round up witnesses and put on a trial once. To keep the charges together, the court had to find that the DA had proffered sufficient pretrial evidence to demonstrate that Nava had a common scheme or plan so that the evidence on one charge would be admissible in the trial on the other charge.

The appeals court in Nava found that the trial court's ruling to let the DA proceed on both charges was an abuse of discretion because even though there were similarities to the crimes, there was no proof of a common scheme or plan. The court reasoned that the crimes were crimes of opportunity, not necessarily a common scheme. The second part of the test is whether the evidence of more than one victim tended to prejudice the defendant unduly. The judges reasoned that the Nava jury might have heard inadmissible evidence. The court cites other cases in pointing out that "evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to the defendant's case…Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests a decision on an improper basis." In the Nava case, allowing a joint trial on both victims could lead a jury to think that because the defendant sexually touched one child, he must have sexually touched both children. As the court said, "Additional testimony from another sexually abused child would have carried an especially high risk of infecting the trial by enhancing each victim's credibility." In the Nava case, the appeals court decided that the charges should have been tried separately.
 
How is this the same or different than the Daybell cases? The charges in Daybell were initially brought on separate indictments that the state now seeks to join.  The defendants are different, and the charges are slightly different.
 
Chad's Charges are:
                Count 1: Destruction, concealment, or alteration of evidence (JJ)
                Count 2: Conspiracy to destroy, conceal or, alter evidence (JJ)
                Count 3: Destruction, concealment, or alteration of evidence (Tylee)
                Count 4: Conspiracy to destroy, conceal or, alter evidence (Tylee)

                Lori's charges are:
                Count 1: Conspiracy to destroy, conceal or alter evidence (JJ)
                Count 2: Conspiracy to destroy, conceal or alter evidence (Tylee)

The crime of conspiracy is separate from the underlying crime the defendant conspired to do.  The underlying crime doesn't even have to be completed for the defendant to be guilty of conspiracy; the act of conspiring is the crime.

While it's clear that the crime and the conspiracy to commit it were part of a common scheme or plan, I think John Prior wins on the issue of undue prejudice.  I think the key for Prior is this statement from Nava: "Having found error in the refusal to sever the charges, the potential exists that the jury heard inadmissible evidence." 

I've thought all along that the stronger argument against joinder was for Mark Means to make.  The argument is that Lori is only charged with the conspiracy to destroy, conceal, or alter evidence.  The state doesn't have to put on any evidence that the crime of destroying, concealing, or altering evidence actually occurred.  That means that the state only has to prove the agreement among Chad, Lori, and Alex.  They don't have to prove the crime was committed. Conversely, in Chad's case, he is charged with actually doing the crime.  That means all the information and grisly photos come in against him.  The jury could be so inflamed by that information that they would find Lori guilty of the conspiracy, even if the evidence of her complicity were flimsy. In other words, even though the crimes were part of a common scheme or plan, Lori would be unduly prejudiced by the admission of the evidence against Chad. This issue is now irrelevant (or as we lawyers say, moot) because Lori waived her objection to joining the cases. 

I don't think the Nava case does John Prior much good. I think the prosecutor can prove evidence of a common scheme, and I don't think the evidence unduly prejudices Chad. 
Hopefully, this explains the Nava case and why it's relevant, but if not, please email me with specific questions.   

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